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The decision has already sent shockwaves through the legal community, as government agencies, developers, and their attorneys determine how Koontz will change the permitting process. Koontz clarifies that the government violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine when it uses the permitting process to make excessive demands for property from permit applicants. 2 To protect applicants from excessive demands, the Court has put the burden on the government to demonstrate that permit conditions-whether they demand land, money, or services-are closely related and roughly proportional to the impact that a development will have. 3 Though contentious, the rule is a straightforward application of decision. Rather, Koontz will protect property rights while also protecting the community by ensuring that developers bear the full costs of their projects.
II. LAND-USE EXACTIONS INTERNALIZE THE FULL COSTS OF DEVELOPMENT
A. The Legitimate Role of Land-Use Exactions Is To Internalize the Spillover Costs of Development
When a property owner decides to develop a piece of land, that decision will inevitably affect his or her neighbors, for better or for worse. Some effects may be impossible to measure: The neighbors may suffer aesthetic pain when seeing an ugly building on what used to be an empty lot, or they may rejoice at beautiful landscaping. Other effects may be more significant, such as, overburdening the sewer system, or causing traffic hazards. Private decisions have spillover effects on the community. Economists call these spillovers "externalities" or "social costs and benefits." 7 Most people generally agree that a legitimate role of government is to require developers to internalize at least the most objectively quantifiable external costs imposed on a community by a new development. 8 For example, if a plan for a giant apartment complex would create traffic hazards, the government can, and should, require the developer to pay for the necessary upgrades to ensure that traffic flows as smoothly and safely as before. 9 By doing so, the 7. See, e.g., PUBLIC GOODS AND MARKET FAILURES: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 2, 53 (Tyler Cowen ed., 2d ed. 1999).
8. E.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 38-39 (1944) ("There are, finally, undoubted fields where no legal arrangements can create the main condition on which the usefulness of the system of competition and private property depends: namely, that the owner benefits from all the useful services rendered by his property and suffers for all the damages caused to others by its use. Where, for example, it is impracticable to make the enjoyment of certain services dependent on the payment of a price, competition will not produce the services; and the price system becomes similarly ineffective when the damage caused to others by certain uses of property cannot be effectively charged to the owner of that property . . . In such instances we must find some substitute for the regulation by the price mechanism.") (emphasis added); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243, 1248 (1997) (" [G] overnments should require new development to internalize the dollar-equivalent cost of its net negative externalities, even if those externalities are impossible or difficult to mitigate."). government is merely ensuring that the developers "internalize" the negative externalities of their development.
Some kinds of impacts may be easy to measure. For example, for many decades cities often required developers to dedicate land for public roads, sidewalks, and sewers that would be needed to serve a new development. 10 But the frequency and types of dedications expanded in the latter half of the twentieth century as sprawling growth patterns and municipal deficits caused government entities to increasingly shift costs to individual developers. 11 The problem is that some externalities (social costs) are difficult to measure. 12 Social cost, like beauty, often is in the eye of the beholder; for example, some may regard the introduction of a modern apartment building into a historic district as a social cost in terms of historic heritage and aesthetics, whereas others may regard it as a welcome addition to an architecturally staid and dull neighborhood. 13 Thus, government entities will have to guess about many kinds of externalities.
14 Those guesses may be significantly shaped by the personal taste or political leanings of the government's decisionmaker.
Government agencies, especially those with budgets inadequate to meet their ambitions, may at times be tempted to inflate fees or level mitigation demands that would subsidize the government's other projects, forcing permit applicants to individually carry the burden of paying for the community's costs. Some exactions might be wholly unrelated to any harm imposed by the project, or wildly perceive traffic congestion as the greatest public problem, outdistancing crime, the economy and housing shortages . . . . Traffic congestion now constitutes a predominant motivating factor behind recent growth control movements in rapidly growing states such as California, Florida and New Jersey."). 11. See id. at 280-81. 12. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In our changing world one thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize predictions about the impact of new urban developments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental harms.") (quoted in Dana, supra note 8, at 1268 n.120).
13. Dana, supra note 8, at 1266. 14. See id.
WILLAMETTE LAW REVIEW [51:39 disproportionate to the extent of the harm. Accordingly, it seems logical to construct safeguards against agencies using the permit process as an opportunity for extortion. Indeed, even before the Supreme Court defined a safeguard, numerous cases sprung up in state courts that recognized that some kind of standard limiting impact fees was necessary. 15 Still, judges largely deferred to the government, and landowners increasingly found themselves at the mercy of agencies that abused the permitting process to fund government projects. 16 Understandably, judges who review land-use exactions may have a difficult time determining whether the exaction is fair since measuring the social costs of a development can be largely subjective. Without clear legal guidelines, it may become an exercise in subjectivity to decide when an exaction goes too far. that the development must create the specific need for the development, but as the dissent explains at 86, the court's deferential standard allows the government to arbitrarily choose a fee "without regard to the location, size, shape, value or restrictions of the lot."); see also Ayres, 207 P.2d at 11 (Carter, J., dissenting) ("The [Majority's] construction . . . has the effect of telling the subdivider that he may dedicate land to the city for the privilege of recording and selling-a matter which is not a privilege, but a right, in other situations, or let the land go idle, or sell it and go to jail, pay a fine, or both. This, it appears to me, amounts to a form of duress[.]").
17. See Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
ME (MARTIN)
.DOC 2/7/2015 1:01 PM
2014]
OH MY! 45 in order to exercise an option to buy the house.
18 They applied to the Coastal Commission for a permit. 19 The Coastal Commission did not hold a hearing or consider any individual traits of the Nollans' redevelopment. 20 It applied the plain language of California's Public Resources Code 21 and applicable regulations and approved the permit application with the statutorily required condition that the Nollans give a public easement over part of the beachside of their property.
22
The permit would not issue until the condition was satisfied. The condition was standard under existing law. The Commission similarly "conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same tract of land." 23 The other 17 permit applications either did not involve shorefront property or had been approved prior to the regulations that imposed the condition.
24
At that time, the rule in California was that permit conditions needed to be related to the impact of the proposed development. However, the relationship could be indirect.
25
The Nollans challenged the permit condition, which eventually led to the Commission providing evidence to try to justify the exaction. 26 The larger house would increase private use of the beach and create a "psychological barrier" between people driving on the nearby highway and the beach, thereby decreasing the public's enjoyment of the seashore. 27 According to the Commission, the demand that the Nollans surrender an easement over the beachside portion of the 18. Id. at 828. 19. Id. 20. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 724 (1986) ("The original Commission decision was made in an administrative permit context and no findings were made, no evidence was in the record other than the application, submissions and the executive director's statement of reasons and no hearing was held.").
21. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30212(a) (2013) ("Public access from the nearest public roadway to the shoreline and along the coast shall be provided in new development projects except where (1) it is inconsistent with public safety, military security needs, or the protection of fragile coastal resources, (2) adequate access exists nearby, or (3) agriculture would be adversely affected.").
22. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828 ("[T]he Commission staff had recommended that the permit be granted subject to the condition that they allow the public an easement to pass across a portion of their property bounded by the mean high tide line on one side, and their seawall on the other side."). property-from the mean high-tide line up to the Nollans' seawallwould increase public access to the beach and make up for that loss. The California Court of Appeals agreed. The court determined the larger house would be another "brick in the wall" blocking public enjoyment of the beach, thus the exaction was reasonably related to the need indirectly created by the Nollans' rebuilding project. 28 Though the larger house alone would not create the need for the easement:
[T]he justification for required dedication is not limited to the needs of or burdens created by the project. Here the Nollans' project has not created the need for access to the tidelands fronting their property but it is a small project among many others which together limit public access to the tidelands and beaches of the state and, therefore, collectively create a need for public access.
29
Even still, the California court held that the relationship was adequate.
The Nollans' case was not heard again until it reached the U.S. Supreme Court. Four Justices agreed with the California court. But a majority of Justices disagreed, holding that a permit condition must have an "essential nexus" to the impact of an applicant's proposed project. 30 An indirect connection to the impact was not enough. The exaction needed to have a close, causal relationship to the actual impact of the project. 31 Or as Justice Blackmun paraphrased in his dissent, the connection must follow "an 'eye for an eye' mentality." 
"[I]
f the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new housefor example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences-so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional." Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said that the Commission's permit condition could not meet this higher standard since it would not directly ameliorate the alleged harm of a larger house: "[A] requirement that people already on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property" did not "lower any 'psychological barrier' to using the public beaches," "reduce[ ] any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house," or "remedy any additional congestion." 33 Since the connection between the demand and the alleged burden created by the house was so blatantly insufficient, the Commission's demand amounted to "an out-and-out plan of extortion." 34 The Commission was abusing the permitting process to get an easement across the Nollans' property without paying for it. 35 The Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution provides that the government can take private property for public use, however, it must pay just compensation. 36 In this way, the Takings Clause uniquely "bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." 37 Thus, the Commission could require property owners to pay to mitigate the direct impact of any proposed development. However, even though the Commission had the power to deny the permit outright, it could not use that power to coerce property owners into giving up property that the Commission would otherwise have to pay for. 42 Florence Dolan had sought a permit from the city to expand her business and parking lot. Pursuant to city code, 43 and armed with a twenty-seven page staff report 44 detailing the need for its proposed exactions, the City of Tigard decided that it would approve her permit application only if she dedicated part of the property for a bike trail and for improvement of the storm drainage system.
45
The City justified the attempted exaction according to its understanding of Nollan. It explained that the expanded parking lot would increase the amount of impervious surface, which would negatively affect flooding, thus requiring the dedicated greenway for storm The bike trail, which would allow customers an alternative path to visiting the store, would help alleviate the extra traffic congestion that a larger store would attract. 47 Oregon courts upheld the conditions. Noting the extensive evidence that the City had advanced to prove the existence of a nexus, both the appellate court and the Oregon Supreme Court held that the City's exactions satisfied Nollan because they were reasonably and directly related to the impacts of Dolan's expansion of her business. 48 Indeed, the conditions were related to the impact the store would have. Every court that reviewed that question agreed that there was a relation, a nexus, including the U.S. Supreme Court. 49 However, the City had not shown that the extent of the exactions was justified. The Supreme Court explained that while "[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required," the government must make an "individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."
53 Not only must a government's permit condition bear an essential nexus to the improvement's impact (as required by Nollan), the condition must also be roughly proportional to the actual 46. Id. at 381-82. 47. Id. 48. Dolan, 854 P.2d at 443-44; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 856 (Or. Ct. App. 1992) ("In addition to the fact that the conditions are part of a general and comprehensive regulatory scheme, the findings demonstrate that the increased water runoff from the intensified development will create conditions to which the greenway/storm water drainage requirement is responsive. Similarly, the pedestrian and bicycle pathway condition is reasonably calculated to alleviate the increased traffic problems and accommodate the increased need and demand for non-vehicular access to the area that will result from the impact of the project. 54 In other words, Justice Blackmun's "eye for an eye" characterization in Nollan was more accurate than his contemporaries probably realized. Moreover, the Court said that the government must bear the burden of justifying the exaction, 55 and the City of Tigard had failed to meet that burden. Admittedly, the greenway would help prevent flooding-the risk of which would grow because of the expansion of impervious surface on the property. But the City had failed to show how that could justify a public greenway. 56 "If petitioner's proposed development had somehow encroached on existing greenway space in the city, it would have been reasonable to require petitioner to provide some alternative greenway space for the public either on her property or elsewhere. But that is not the case here."
57 Likewise, while a pedestrian or bicycle path "could offset some of the traffic" created by a larger store, the city had failed to show that it was "likely."
58
While a "precise mathematical calculation" was not necessary, the Court held that "the city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication." In Nollan, supra, we held that governmental authority to exact such a condition was circumscribed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Under the well-settled doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions," the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property. Nollan itself did not mention the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, though it cited precedent that did.
61
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits the government from requiring an individual to give up a constitutionally protected right as the condition of exercising another constitutional right or receiving a government benefit. Dolan cited to Perry v. Sindermann, which explained:
[E]ven though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .
62
In Perry, a professor's contract was not renewed at a state school allegedly based on his speaking against the school's leadership. 63 There, the "valuable governmental benefit" was employment at the college. 64 Though he had no right to the job, the Court explained why it would be impermissible to fire him for his public criticism. The Court explained:
[I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government to 'produce a result which (it) could not command directly.' 65 Perry did not use the term "unconstitutional conditions doctrine." Similarly, Nollan did not use that language, but rested on the same principle forbidding the government from leveraging its power to accomplish indirectly something that it could not achieve directly. There was an important distinction, however, between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the context of land-use permits versus the context of other rights. As the Court explained in Nollan, "the right to build on one's own property-even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements-cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit. '" 68 In that sense, the stakes are higher than in a normal unconstitutional conditions case. In Perry, the benefit at issue was public employmentsomething created by and affirmatively bestowed by the government. 69 In Nollan and Dolan, the corresponding "benefit" was the lawful use of private property-property that belonged to the landowner, not the government. Dolan has no right to be compensated for a taking unless the city acquires the property interests that she has refused to surrender. Since no taking has yet occurred, there has not been any infringement of her constitutional right to compensation.
70
This of course misses the point of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. In Perry, the plaintiff's free speech right had not been taken away; he had freely communicated his disagreement with the school's leadership. 71 But he was penalized for exercising his right. Likewise, Dolan's right to just compensation had not actually been taken since she refused the permit conditions. But she was penalized for rejecting the excessive condition. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine recognizes that government cannot use its coercive power over permits to take indirectly what it could not take directly without paying just compensation. broad applicability was that they did not easily harmonize with the pre-existing takings landscape articulated in Penn Central, Lucas, and Loretto. 76 The government could reject a permit application and be subject to the overwhelmingly deferential standard of Penn Central. 77 But if the government granted the permit with conditions then suddenly a stricter scrutiny applied under Nollan and Dolan-even though granting a permit with conditions might seem more gracious to a landowner than granting none at all.
A clear split developed in interpreting Nollan and Dolan, notably over whether their nexus and rough proportionality requirements applied to monetary exactions, or only to demands for the conveyance of land. 99 In 1994, Koontz wanted to build on 3.7 acres of his vacant land, so he applied for a permit from the St. Johns River Water Management District. 100 Like countless landowners across the country, he embarked on the permitting process.
101
According to the District, the property that Koontz wanted to develop contained valuable wetlands, even though the wetlands were "seriously degraded . . . by all of the activity around it." 102 The property was located immediately next to two highways and near significant residential and commercial developments, road construction, and government projects.
103 Florida Power Corporation had a 100-foot wide easement for large power lines running through the property that it kept cleared and mowed.
104
A 60-foot wide government drainage ditch also ran through the property. 105 The only standing water on the property formed in ruts of an access road used for the power lines. 106 But at the District's request, Koontz offered to dedicate the remaining three-quarters of his land to a conservation easement, in exchange for permit approval. 107 The District wanted more, however, and said that unless Koontz agreed to pay for repairs to government lands miles away, it would not approve his permit. Koontz, believing the demand unfair, objected. 109 In response, the District denied his permit application and Koontz sued.
The trial court ruled in favor of Koontz, finding that the offsite mitigation lacked the essential nexus to the impact of Koontz's proposed development required by Nollan. 110 Moreover, even if a nexus existed, anything beyond the proposed conservation easement over Koontz's land would exceed Dolan's requirement that the condition be roughly proportional to any external costs of the project. 111 In a subsequent proceeding, the court awarded Koontz damages for the years he was denied his permit.
112
The District appealed, arguing that no exaction had occurred because nothing was taken from Koontz, since the permit application was never approved.
113 Furthermore, the District contended that the demand for money (or services) could not violate Nollan and Dolan, since those cases supposedly involved only dedications of real property.
114
The appellate court affirmed, stating simply that the Supreme Court had already answered these questions. The Court explained that the majority in Dolan "implicitly rejected" the argument that no taking can occur without an actual transfer of property, because the dissent had made that argument. Those cases were also held to be inapplicable because Koontz's permit was denied.
119
The court posited legal arguments, but its opinion seemed rooted more in policy than in precedent. 120 The court argued that defending land-use restrictions and exactions, if subject to Nollan and Dolan, would become prohibitively expensive for government agencies, since they would be subject to judicial scrutiny.
121
"[R]ather than risk the crushing costs of litigation," government agencies would instead "deny permits outright without discussion or negotiation." 122 Koontz appealed, and nineteen years after he started the permit process, the U.S. Supreme Court settled two questions: (1) whether Nollan and Dolan protect permit applicants when the government demands money or labor in exchange for a permit, and (2) whether Nollan and Dolan apply when the government's demands precede permit approval and result in a permit denial. 123 In a contentious decision, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner on both issues:
Nollan and Dolan apply to monetary exactions and also to situations where the government denies a permit because the applicant refuses to comply with conditions. 119. Id. 120. Id. "It is both necessary and logical to limit land-use exactions doctrine to these narrow circumstances. Governmental entities must have the authority and flexibility to independently evaluate permit applications and negotiate a permit award that will benefit a landowner without causing undue harm to the community or the environment."). over the timing of the permit conditions. 125 After all, the District had not actually issued Koontz a conditional permit, since he had refused to agree to the District's demands for off-site mitigation. If no permit was issued, and no property ever changed hands, then how could a taking occur?
This From one standpoint, of course, such a distinction [between a permit denial and a permit acceptance] makes no sense. The object of the Court's holding in Nollan and Dolan was to protect against the State's cloaking within the permit process "'an out-and-out plan of extortion,'" . . . There is no apparent reason why the phrasing of an extortionate demand as a condition precedent rather than as a condition subsequent should make a difference. It is undeniable, on the other hand, that the subject of any supposed taking in the present case is far from clear.
127
The Court in Koontz answered this question by simply pointing out that Nollan and Dolan are a special application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. 128 The Court explained that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine "vindicates the Constitution's All nine justices agreed on this point. 133 Whether the government demands that a permit applicant consent to a development exaction prior to the permit decision makes no difference to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
134 "A contrary rule would be especially untenable in this case because it would enable the government to evade the limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as conditions precedent to permit approval."
135 Or, as Justice Alito said during oral argument, such an interpretation amounts to "making Nollan and Dolan a trap only for really stupid districts . . . they say the right words and then they are out from under it . . . ." 136 In other words, the government could demand whatever it wants in exchange for a permit, provided that it is clever enough to not explicitly write the demand on a permit acceptance or denial. That kind of ruling would also amount to instructing property owners to accept unconstitutional permit conditions in order to challenge them.
The Court cited unconstitutional conditions cases that did not Nollan-Dolan standard applies not only when the government approves a development permit conditioned on the owner's conveyance of a property interest (i.e., imposes a condition subsequent), but also when the government denies a permit until the owner meets the condition (i.e., imposes a condition precedent)."). apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to the permitting process in a way that accommodates two realities: First, landowners need protection against the manipulative power that government can wield in the permitting process:
[L]and-use permit applicants are especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more than property it would like to take . . . . So long as the building permit is more valuable than any just compensation the owner could hope to receive for the [exacted property], the owner is likely to accede to the government's demand, no matter how unreasonable. 138 Second, the government can require developers to pay for the costs that they would otherwise impose on society:
[M]any proposed land uses threaten to impose costs on the public that dedications of property can offset. Where a building proposal would substantially increase traffic congestion, for example, officials might condition permit approval on the owner's agreement to deed over the land needed to widen a public road . . . . Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.
139
Nollan and Dolan, the Court explained, protect property owners from the sort of inappropriate demands that "frustrate the Fifth Amendment right to just compensation" without allowing developers to get a free ride. not involve property changing hands. 141 The harm occurred when the government used its coercive permitting power to make an extortionate demand for Koontz's resources in exchange for a permit. "Even if respondent would have been entirely within its rights in denying the permit for some other reason" that authority does not grant the government "power to condition permit approval on petitioner's forfeiture of his constitutional rights."
142
Nor did it matter whether a permit was issued or denied. 143 The question of whether any property was ever physically taken was relevant only to determining the remedy. 144 The Court explained that when government takes property with an inappropriate permit condition, the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay just compensation for the property it wrongly exacted. 145 But in Koontz, because no property was physically taken, and because damages were awarded under state law, the Court declined to decide "what remedies might be available for a Nollan/Dolan [claim] ." 150 But the District argued that its own attempt to get Koontz to repair government property was different because it never took anything; it only asked Koontz to spend money. 151 The obligation to spend money could not be likened to a claim on real property (with all of the attendant protections of the Takings Clause), because money is fungible.
152 Finally, if the court did treat the obligation to spend money as private property protected by the Takings Clause, then a "broad range of monetary obligationsapplication fees, usage fees, and so forth"-would be subject to takings clause protections and Nollan and Dolan's heightened scrutiny. 153 This, the district warned, would threaten every mitigation requirement that may require a property owner to pay money to complete.
154
To make its case that the obligation to spend money is not property, the district relied on Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, a case where the Court overturned a law that retroactively required a company to fund health benefits for retired former employees. 155 The [T]he majority extends the Takings Clause, with its notoriously "difficult" and "perplexing" standards, into the very heart of local land-use regulation and service delivery . . . . Cities and towns across the nation impose many kinds of permitting fees every day. Some enable a government to mitigate a new development's impact on the community, like increased traffic or pollution-or destruction of wetlands. Still others are meant to limit the number of landowners who engage in a certain activity, as fees for liquor licenses do. All now must meet Nollan and Dolan's nexus and proportionality tests. The Federal Constitution thus will decide whether one town is overcharging for sewage, or another is setting the price to sell liquor too high. And the flexibility of state and local governments to take the most routine actions to enhance their communities will diminish accordingly. Equally untenable are the dissent's concerns that government will not be able to require a new development to mitigate its impact on traffic or the environment. Koontz, Nollan, and Dolan all explicitly provide that permitting agencies may require developers to mitigate their negative impacts. These agencies simply must show that demands for mitigation are closely related and roughly proportional to the development's actual impact. Requiring the government to show how its conditions will mitigate those social costs helps protect property owners from being coerced into providing the community with benefits unrelated to, or grossly disproportionate to, any spillovers created by the use of their property. shattering, but simply requires governments not to "overreach," but to tailor mitigation to the actual impact of the project.
170
The Koontz dissent concluded by saying that extending constitutional protections to Koontz was not necessary since no one proved that monetary exactions had become a problem. 171 A similar argument was made by the District's amici: The brief by the National Governor's Association, et al., asserted that there is no need for such Constitutional safeguards because "conscientious local officials work hard on a daily basis to fairly balance the numerous competing demands they confront in the regulatory process." 172 But this argument ignores the many examples of abuse cited by Koontz's amici, Cato Institute, and Institute for Justice.
173 Anyway, if extortion is not a problem, as some claim, then that means that government is usually good at tailoring demands-all the more reason to have confidence that government will continue to require developers to mitigate the actual impact their development would have. As Justice Alito pointed out in Koontz, the "argument that land use permit applicants need no further protection when the government demands money is really an argument for overruling Nollan and Dolan." protected against temporary regulatory takings, 175 the dissent warned that "the policy implications" of the decision were "far reaching," would "generate a great deal of litigation," and would likely cause "[c]autious local officials and land-use planners" to fail to enact "important regulation" out of fear of litigation. Takings Clause cases, the Court has heard the prophecy that recognizing a just compensation claim would unduly impede the government's ability to act in the public interest."
177 But the Court dismissed those fears explaining, While we recognize the importance of the public interests the Government advances in this case, we do not see them as categorically different from the interests at stake in myriad other Takings Clause cases. The sky did not fall [before] , and today's modest decision augurs no deluge of takings liability.
178
The same could be said of Nollan and Dolan. In Nollan, Justice Steven's dissent warned that the "unreasonably demanding standard" the Court applied to the Nollans' permit condition "could hamper" conservation efforts. 179 After Dolan some environmentalists feared that Nollan and Dolan would ruin conservation efforts, disrupting a wide range of environmental law.
180
These fears have uniformly turned out to be exaggerated in the past, and they will likely prove to be so after Koontz as well. Koontz is completely consistent with Nollan and Dolan and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. No permit was actually issued in any of the cases, since every property owner objected to the government's attempted exaction. Every case recognizes that the government has a right to require landowners to internalize the social costs they would otherwise impose on their neighbors or community. At the same time, they all recognize that government should have to justify its demands for cost internalization, since the temptation to coercively take resources by the permitting process could allow the government to impose community costs onto permit applicants. Government should not be able to avoid justifying its exactions simply by requiring compliance with its demands prior to approving a permit application. Similarly, government should not be able to avoid justifying its exactions by simply assigning a dollar sign to the demand or requiring services instead of demanding the conveyance of land. As the Court explained in Nolan, "We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a pleading requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness and imagination." 182 Koontz simply reiterates that directive.
182. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 839.
